

Evaluation Series : 8

Vocational Training for Returnees

Dr. Jayanta Choudhury



Tribal Research and Cultural Institute
Government of Tripura, Agartala

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Vocational Training for Tribal Returees

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MESSAGE

Government of India has launched a special scheme for Surrender-Cum-Rehabilitation of militants in the North-East. The objective of the scheme is to wean away the misguided youth and hardcore militants that have strayed into the fold of militancy and now find themselves rapped into that net. The schemes also seek to ensure that the militants who have surrendered do not find it attractive to join militancy again. The Government of Tripura is also keen to provide misguided youths all benefits available as per the scheme and join them in mainstream development.

The present volume of evaluation series is based on the research study conducted by Dr. Jayanta Choudhury, Asst. Professor, Department of Rural Management & Development & Coordinator, Centre for Rural Studies, Tripura University in five districts of Tripura. The study tried to find out overall performance of the scheme and its impact on different livelihood aspects of tribal returnees.

I strongly believe that the findings and recommendation of the study will enlighten the performance of the scheme in Tripura.



**Shri Sunil Debbarma,
Director**

**Place : Agartala
Date : 05/10/2017**

**Tribal Research and Cultural Institute
Government of Tripura**

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Tripura is witnessed of several casualties due to insurgency for more than three decades. Insurgency in Tripura finds its root in the influx of refugees from the newly emerged East Pakistan after partition, post independence and post 1971 war liberation in Bangladesh. Migration fuelled discontent and demographic intervention in Tripura. This has led to serious discontent among the tribals, who have become a minority in their own land. In addition to land, control of trade and business, government jobs are now in the hands of the immigrants. In order to protect their rights, numbers of Tribal youth had formed and joined several extremist groups. The State Government is keen to keep the door open for those misguided youths ready to renounce the path of violence and rejoin the mainstream. The State Government is ready to provide such youths with all benefits available as per the scheme of the Government of India for Surrender-Cum-Rehabilitation of militants in the North-East.

One of the components of the Surrender-Cum-Rehabilitation scheme was imparting training in a trade/vocation of their liking or benefiting their aptitude while lodged in a rehabilitation camp.

Tribal Research and Cultural Institute has taken an initiative to review the scheme. The study tries to find out the impact of scheme on improvement of livelihood among the tribal people and also gives some suggestions and recommendations for possible consideration of the Government of Tripura.

My sincere thanks go to the Sri. S. Debbarma, Director, Tribal Research and Cultural Institute, Government of Tripura for publishing the evaluation series. I am also thankful to Sri. Bidyut Kanti Dhar, Research Assistant of TR & CI for his sincere effort in various stages to bring the manuscript in series form.

I acknowledge the sincere help of students of Tripura University and IGNOU for involving during various stages of the evaluation study. We were enriched enormously by the discussions with various state Government officials, local level functionaries and beneficiaries during the study.

However, I am responsible for any fault that may remains.

Date : 05/10/2017

Dr. Jayanta Choudhury

Place : Agartala, Tripura

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RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS

- Among the returnees 40.3 percent were from BPL families and 40.7 percent had studied upto secondary education.
- During the survey, it was found that 34.3 percent were daily labor and 5 percent were government employee.
- About 73.9 percent respondents were benefited by Government programmes like MGNREGA.
- 'Freeing their land from Bengali people' was main motivation for 53.6 percent respondents for joining various extremist group.
- 71.6 percent returnees confirmed that training was effective but 66.8 percent respondents were not satisfied about follow up supports provided after training.
- Only 8.7 percent trainees were able to apply gained skill into livelihood activities.
- Financial problem, lack of technical knowledge, required skill, lack of proper selection of livelihood activities and raw materials were major constraints to start/run livelihood activities after vocational training.
- The returnees who were running their livelihood activities, confirmed that their monthly income; additional employment; membership in SHG; involvement in developmental works in Gram Panchayet or Village Committee; social status in outside home has increased considerably.

INTRODUCTION

Tripura is a state in Northeast India, where the seven contiguous states - Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura – are collectively known as the Seven Sister States. The third-smallest state in the country, it covers 10,491 km² and is bordered by Bangladesh (East Bengal) to the north, south, and west, and the Indian states of Assam and Mizoram to the east. In 2011, the state had 3,671,032 residents, constituting 0.3 percent of the country's population. Indigenous communities, known in India as Scheduled Tribe, constitutes 3 percent of total population in Tripura. Tripura was a princely state that acceded to the Indian Union on October 15, 1949. It became a Union Territory on November 1, 1956 and a full-fledged State on January 21, 1972. (Chatterji, 1972)

Tripura lies in a geographically disadvantageous location in India, as only one major highway, the National Highway 44, connects with the rest of the country. Starting at Sabroom in southern Tripura, it heads north to the capital Agartala, turns east and then north-east to enter the state of Assam. Locally known as "Assam-Agartala Road", the NH-44 is often called the lifeline of Tripura. However, the highway is single lane and of poor quality; often landslides, rains or other disruptions on the highway cut the state off from its neighbors. Another National Highway, NH 44A, connects the town Manu in South Tripura district with Aizawl, Mizoram.

The state has five anticlinal ranges of hills running north to south, from Boromura in the west, through Atharamura, Longtharai and Shakhan, to the Jampui Hills in the east. *Belling Shib* in the Jampui range is the state's highest point. Tripura is an agrarian state with more than half of the population dependent on agriculture and allied activities. However, due to hilly terrain

and forest cover, only 27 per cent of the land is available for cultivation. Rice, the major crop of the state, is cultivated in 91 per cent of the cropped area.

Tripura, once ruled by tribal kings of the Manikya dynasty with tribals constituting the majority among their subjects, merged with India officially on October 15, 1949. According to the 1941 census, tribals constituted 53.16 percent of the population; in just ten years that figure was down to 37.23 percent. The demographic change paved the way for the eventual conflict between the tribals and Bengali migrants which devastated the state for more than three decades. In addition, the independence of India led to Tripura's geographical isolation from the 'mainland' creating major hurdles to economic development, especially communications and transport since all goods and travelers had to move by a circuitous route bypassing Bangladesh to reach the "mainland." (*Baruah 2011*)

1.1. Tribal Insurgency in Tripura:

In the 2001 census of India, Bengalis represented almost 69 percent of Tripura's population because of large influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh while the indigenous Tripuri population amounted to 3 percent. The States scheduled tribes historically disadvantaged groups of people recognize by the country's constitution, consist of 19 ethnic groups and many sub groups with diverse languages and cultures. (*Das 1999*)

They could be divided into 2 (two) major groups as (i) Ab-original and (ii) Immigrants. All the aboriginal tribes have been migrated in this territory from a place in-between Tibbet, up hills of Burma like Arakan Hills Tracts and Shan State and adjacent to China. Aboriginal tribes are Tripuri, Reang, Jamatia, Noatia, Lusai, Uchai, Chaimal, Halam, Kukis, Garos, Mog and Chakma. Other tribes like Bill, Munda, Orang, Santal, Lepcha, Khasia, Bhutias are the immigrant tribes came and settled here for economic reasons.

Most of them are Central Indian Tribes and came from Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal. Some of these tribes are however Northern-Frontier tribes came from Bhutan, Meghalaya, Sikkim and North Bengal. Chakmas and Mogs are Arakan Tribes entered Tripura through Chittagang Hills Tracts. (Das, 1999)

Indigenous tribal constitute about 31 per cent of Tripura's population. In terms of numbers 9,93,426 people in the state's total population of 31,99,203, where male population constitute 50.76 per cent and female population constitute 49.23 per cent of tribal population. Tripuris or Tripura is the largest tribal community in Tripura and comprises 54.74 per cent population in total tribes of Tripura. They have first migrated in this territory and could be introduced as aboriginal tribe of Tripura. The Kokborok speaking Tripuri people are the major group of tribes. Traditionally most of the tribal population practiced shifting or jhum cultivation and were termed as jhumias. Jhumia is a generic term used for tribal people dependent on shifting cultivation as the primary source of livelihood. The big concentration of jhumia families were in Dhalai and South District. Nevertheless, forest remains an important source of livelihood for the tribal population. Jhum cultivation has an intimate relationship with forest use, not only in terms of the habitation and cultivation of tracts inside forest areas, but also because the forestry sector provides important supplementary income and inputs in the daily lives of tribal people. (Das, 1999)

Tripura is rich in forest wealth. This hilly state is largely covered with sal, segun, peepul and banyan and other kinds of trees. All these forest wealth provide the tribal people with enough wood for furniture and other building materials. Indeed almost sixty per cent of the areas of Tripura are covered with forest. In Tripura there are abundant bamboos and canes. The handicrafts are in great demand not only in Tripura but also outside Tripura. In short, the

forest wealth of Tripura provides livelihood to thousands of tribal people. Tripura is also rich in rubber plantation. The climatic condition is favorable for rubber plantation. (Das, 1999)

Insurgency in Tripura finds its root in the influx of refugees from the emerged East Pakistan after partition, post independence and post 1971 war liberation in Bangladesh. Migration fuelled discontent and demographic intervention in Tripura. The population ratio of tribals and non-tribals which was 70:30 in favor of non-tribals. The injustice has led to insurgency. The genesis of insurgency in Tripura can be traced to the massive influx of Bengali refugees from East Pakistan following partition. The indigenous people, who accounted for 95 per cent of the population of Tripura in the 1931 census, had been reduced to just 31 per cent at the time of the 1991 census. This has led to serious discontent among the tribals, who have become a minority in their own land. In addition to land, control of trade and business, government jobs are now in the hands of the immigrants. In order to protect their rights, some tribes formed a political front called *Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti* (TUJS) in June 1967. They demanded an autonomous district council under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, adoption of Kok Borok as official language and the restoration of tribal lands allotted to non-tribals. (Bhowmik, 1991)

By 1970, some people had come to believe that only armed action could secure their demands and the Tripura Sena (Tripura Army) was created. Subsequently, in December 1978, the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) was formed under the leadership of Bijoy Hrangkhall to fight for an independent tribal Tripura state. To assuage tribal feelings, the State government passed the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council Act in 1979. However, it was strongly opposed by a section of the Bengali population. To counter the pressures from the tribal extremists, they also launched a militant

organisation called Amra Bangali (We Are Bengalis). Consequently, violent communal clashes broke out in several parts of the State in which about 1,800 people lost their lives, and over 3,600 dwellings were burnt. In June 1980, the Army was introduced in the State, and the situation was brought under control. (Bhowmik, 1991)

The TNV, with its strong hold in the Jampui area bordering Mizoram, had close links with the Mizo National Front (MNF). But with the signing of the Mizo Accord in 1986 and the subsequent surrender of the MNF to the authorities, the TNV's ability to continue the armed struggle was severely curbed. On August 12, 1988, the TNV signed a Memorandum of Settlement with the State government and its members laid down arms and came over ground. The main point of the agreement was the restoration of alienated lands to the tribal people. However, there were persistent complaints that the agreement had not been implemented. New militant outfits had since come into being and there has been a resurgence of militancy in the State. (Bhowmik, 1991)

1.1.1. National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)

It became obvious that the TNV had played a role in bringing the Congress-TUJS coalition to power in 1988, after which it returned to normal life and its chief BK Hrangkhawl was made the chairman of the Tripura Rehabilitation Plantation Corporation (TRPC). But the coalition failed to address tribal issues seriously and even the rehabilitation process of the surrendered rebels was messed up because funds meant for that purpose were diverted to other heads. The TNV's vice president, Dhananjay Reang, revolted against Hrangkhawl and with his cohorts disappeared into the jungles to form the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) in 1992. Later Reang was expelled from the NLFT and he formed his own group, the

Tripura Resurrection Army (TRA) in 1994 to maintain his presence in the tribal underground. The TRA later surrendered to the Government in 1997. But one of Reang's lieutenants, Biswamohan Debbarma, took over as the president of the NLFT and continues to head one of its factions. The NLFT has split thrice, mostly along tribal lines. The differences between the Halam and Tripuri tribal members of the NLFT is believed to be behind the second split that led to the formation of the Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT) by Jogendra alias Joshua Debbarma in September 2000. The NLFT split further in February 2001 due to differences between its Christian members and the Hindu tribes, after which the group's most dreaded field commander Nayanbasi Jamatiya came out with 137 guerrillas. He however made some heavy political demands which were rejected, following which he fled back into Bangladesh, but his fighters almost wholly surrendered to the Tripura police. Another group of nearly 80 fighters led by Mantu Koloi also surrendered.

Police records based on interrogation reports of surrendered/arrested cadres reveal that the split occurred as a result of:

- a. Reluctance of the Central Executive Committee of NLFT led by Biswamohan Debbarma to nominate Joshua Debbarma as the King of 'Tripura Kingdom';
- b. Misappropriation of funds by senior leaders;
- c. Lavish life styles led by the senior leadership; and
- d. Forcible conversion of tribal cadres/civilians to Christianity.

1.1.2. The All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF)

The All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) was originally founded as All Tripura Tribal Force on July 11, 1990, by a group of former Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) terrorists, who under the leadership of Ranjit Debbarma

dissociated themselves from a faction of the TNV led by Lalit Debbarma which surrendered arms in accordance with the August 1988 Accord concluded between the TNV and the Union government. According to the ATTF, the outfit rechristened itself as All Tripura Tiger Force by substituting the word 'Tribal' with 'Tiger' sometime in 1992.

It was initially a small group of tribal extremists who operated in pockets of North and South Tripura districts. Gradually, it began mobilising manpower by recruiting tribal youth and enhancing the firepower of its cadres. And by year 1991, it emerged as a formidable terrorist group in Tripura. However, more than 1,600 cadres surrendered by March 1994, under an amnesty scheme offered by the State Government. A group of ATTF cadres which did not surrender revived the ATTF. It was subsequently banned in April 1997 under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Over the years, the ATTF either formed or was associated with fringe terrorist/criminal groupings such as the Tripura Tribal Youth Force (TTYF), the Tripura Liberation Organization (TLO), the Tripura Young Rifle (TYR), the Tripura Lion Force (TLF) and the Tripura National Army (TNA). Most of these groups, however, have ceased to exist.

According to the available literature, the outfit's objectives were :

1. Expulsion of all Bengali-speaking immigrant settlers who entered Tripura after 1956.
2. Restoration of land to tribals under 'Tripura Land Revenue and Land Reforms Act', 1960.
3. Removal of names of migrants who entered Tripura after 1956 from the electoral roll.

The ATTF had resisted official attempts for a negotiated settlement of the insurgency. On April 22, 2004, however, the outfit's 'President', Ranjit Debbarma, laid down three conditions for the peace process to commence:

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- Those who entered Tripura after 1949 and whose names did not figure in the Voters list of 1952 should be declared as foreigners;
- The issue of sovereignty should be point of discussion in the peace talks; and
- A representative of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) should be present during the peace talks.

The character and scale of violence by these insurgent groups was also illustrated by the casualty figures over the years in the state: between 1992 to 2003, these groups had killed 2,278 civilians, including tribals and 354 security force personnel. In 2000, 453 people were killed, as the rebel violence peaked. Through this period (1992-2000), total fatalities among the insurgent ranks remained at a relatively insignificant 306. That the bulk of the fatalities were of target civilian, specially Bengali settlers in mixed populated areas, testifies to the fact that all the rebel factions adopted ethnic cleansing as their chosen strategy to create tribal compact areas from mixed populated areas so that a future tribal homeland would have the least possible 'unwanted population'. The relatively small fraction of losses inflicted on the security forces as well as those suffered from the insurgents themselves indicate that the rebel groups were keen to conserve their limited strength by avoiding major confrontation with Indian security forces (SF), unlike the separatist groups in the Nagaland and the Mizoram hills or later in Manipur.

Table 1 : Insurgency related killings 1992-2016 in Tripura

Year	Civilians	SF personnel	Terrorists	Total
1992	59	18	21	98
1993	148	28	7	183
1994	206	22	10	238
1995	178	34	45	257
1996	140	31	18	189
1997	205	50	19	274
1998	214	25	26	265
1999	240	41	22	303
2000	453	16	45	514
2001	239	31	42	312
2002	94	43	38	175
2003	195	39	61	295
2004	66	38	63	167
2005	34	8	31	73
2006	11	19	30	60
2007	10	5	21	36
2008	7	4	17	28
2009	9	1	1	11
2010	0	2	1	3
2011	1	0	0	1
2012	0	0	2	2
2013	0	0	0	0
2014	2	2	0	4
2015	0	0	0	0
2016	0	0	0	0

Source-www.satp.org

The culture of violence as a prelude to the democratic process continued in early 2003, with both the NLFT and ATTF targeting opponents of their political patrons, although the former inflicted more civilian fatalities. Despite the greater violence inflicted by the NLFT, the indigenous Nationalist party of Tripura (INPT)- Congress combine backed by this group was unable to secure victory, and the alliance managed to win only 19 seats in the 60-member Assembly. Another intriguing feature underlay the creation of the INPT through the merger of the IPFT and the TUJS: the merger is believed to have occurred on the directions of the NLFT which wanted a single political party representing “tribal interest” in the state.

1.2. State Government Strategy:

The approach for solution has been addressed the problems of insurgency and extremism in a holistic manner. The State Government has been considering and ready to consider any political demand within the democratic framework of the constitution of India in the overall interest of the state as a whole. Restoration of alienated tribal lands is being undertaken and provisions relating to these have been made stricter. The State Government has taken up broadcasting programming in local languages on radio and TV and the opening of a channel of All India Radio in Kokborok, the main tribal language in the state. Kokborok is also taught as a language in the tribal areas at the school level.

The State Government has given top priorities for supply of drinking water, public housing and connectivity of village roads. It has also identified deficiencies and resource requirements for universal coverage on other basic minimum services such as nutrition, public distribution system, primary health and primary education and new infrastructure such as transport, electricity, Radio and TV, post primary education, agriculture and allied sectors,

administrative and cultural infrastructure including tourism etc. in addition, different policies have been taken and are under consideration to create more economic and employment opportunities for the tribal youth. These are in the form of opening of international border for trade and transit, permitting forest based development through viable schemes of small scale rubber and tea plantations and support for gas based industries. These options to enable the living standards of the tribal population to be boosted are to go hand in hand with the need to marginalize the extremist elements.

State Government had appealed several times to the misguided elements to give up the path of violence and join the mainstream so that the State and its people could proceed with nation building activities and take up programmes for economic development in an atmosphere of peace and tranquility through democratic process. In response to the calls, several listed extremists submitted offers of unconditional or conditional surrender. The State Government is keen to keep the door open for those misguided youths ready to renounce the path of violence and rejoin the mainstream. The State Government is ready to provide such youths with all benefits available as per the scheme of the Government of India for surrender-Cum-Rehabilitation of militants in the North-East.

1.3. Scheme for surrender-cum rehabilitation of militants in the North East:

1.3.1. Objectives of the Scheme:

The main objective of the scheme is to wean away the misguided youth and hardcore militants that have strayed into the fold of militancy and now find themselves rapped into that net. The scheme also seeks to ensure that the militants who have surrendered do not find it attractive to join militancy again.

1.3.2. Eligibility Criteria:

- The scheme is applicable to those militants who surrender at least with one weapon.
- In exceptional and deserving cases, militants who surrender without arms may also be considered for rehabilitation under the scheme.
- The name of such militants would be scrutinized by the screening committee.
- The benefits of the scheme shall not be available to a surrenderee who is a recycled militant/ terrorist.

1.3.3. Benefits under the Scheme:

- Persons eligible under the scheme will be initially lodged in a Rehabilitation camp where they will be imparted training in a trade/vocation of their liking or benefiting their aptitude.
- They shall be paid a monthly stipend for a period of 36 months. The stipend in respect of a surrenderee shall not exceed Rs. 2000 per month. The scale of stipend for various categories of surrenderees will be decided by the State Government in consultation with the Government of India.
- An immediate grant of Rs. 1.5 Lakh to be kept in a bank in the name of surrenderee as fixed deposit for a period of 3 years.
- The money can be withdrawn by the surrenderee after 3 years subject to good behavior.

Note 1: This money can be utilized as collateral security/margin money against loan to be availed by the surrenderee from the bank for self employment.

Note 2: In the event of a surrenderee being able to secure any Government job either in central Government/PSU/Army/State Government/ Cooperatives, where the Central/State Government has a share, this amount

will not given to the surrenderee.

1.3.4 Crimes committed by the militants:

- Minor crime cases against successfully rehabilitated surrenderees will be withdrawn.
- The surrenderees who have committed heinous crimes like murder, rape, abduction etc. will be subject to the due process of law and surrender shall not imply amnesty from the crimes.
- A surrenderee who indulges in crime while under rehabilitation shall forfeit the benefits under the scheme.

1.4. Vocational Training

Vocational Education can be defined as the education that is based on occupation and employment. Vocational Education is also known as career and technical education (CTE) or technical and vocational education and training (TVET). It prepares people for specific trades, crafts and careers at various levels in all spheres of life. It involves various practical activities. It is sometimes referred as technical education because the trainee directly develops expertise in a particular group of techniques. Vocational education is related to the age-old apprenticeship system of learning. In other words Vocational Education may be classified as teaching procedural knowledge. Vocational education consists basically of practical courses through which one gains skills and experience directly linked to a career in future. It helps students to be skilled and in turn, offers better employment opportunities.

Vocational, or skills-based, education is becoming more and more important today, with many employers expecting new employees to have all the practical skills they need to start work and also for those who have to support their families immediately. Vocational courses are typically more

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practical and skills-based. Vocational Education and Training (VET) is an important element of the nation's education initiative. Vocational education has to be viewed from different multi-layered practices. One is of course the hands on training component. The other is employment generation and sustainability.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1. Objectives:

1. To know the present socio-economic conditions of Tribal Returnees.
2. To study the vocational training process for Returnees.
3. To assess the impact of vocational training on life and livelihood of returnees militants.

2.2. Methodology:

The present study is empirical in nature and based on mainly primary data collected through field survey. In order to analyze the data simple statistical tools were adopted. Before and after analysis and case study method was used to find out the impact of the vocational training for returnees in Tripura.

2.3. Sampling:

The study was confined to five districts of Tripura namely Gomati, Sepahijala, Dhalai, West Khowai. In order to conduct the study, purposive sampling method was adopted for the selection of surrendered returnees from the list of vocational training centres. The districts have been selected based on the concentration of surrendered returnees. Overall approximately 460 (around 25%) enlisted returnees who had received vocational trainings were considered as target population for collection of primary data.

Sample Size

SLNo.	District	Targeted Respondents	Available	Not Available
1	West	90	67	23
2	Dhalai	100	88	12
3	Sepahijala	70	59	11
4	Gomati	100	91	9
5	Khowai	100	75	25
6	Total	460	38	80

Respondents were not available due to:

- Change of address as mentioned in the list
- Normal death
- Some returnees were not willing to disclose themselves

2.4. Data Collection:

The primary data was collected through structural interview of surrendered returnees. The secondary data and pertinent literature was compiled from published, documented and internet sources. The field survey was conducted with the help of structured interview schedule pertain the relevant to the objectives of the study.

2.5. Data Analysis:

The filled in interview schedules were thoroughly checked and processed with the help of relevant software. The data was processed with the help of computers for drawing out results and conclusion. Data was interpreted, discussed and analyzed besides critical appreciation of pertinent literature. Analysis part is divided into five parts. First part deals with present socio economic condition of returnees; Second part is about the process of rehabilitation; Third part discusses the process of vocational training and its

impact; and last part identifies the constraints towards application of vocational training for livelihood activities. Constraints were analyzed following constraints index.

Constraints Index:

This Index is for calculating the level of constraint for participating in livelihood on a particular parameter. A list of 21 (twenty one) parameters i.e. potential constraints related to required assets, access, ability, assurance and attitude related to specific livelihood activity were listed. Rural Trainees were asked to indicate their response for each constraint on a four-point scale (Rahaman et al, 2007) where 3 assigned for 'high', 2 for 'moderate', 1 for 'low', 0 for 'not at all'. Finally, a Constraint Index (CI) was calculated for ranking the constraint as follows:

$$\text{Constraint Index (CI)} = C4 \times 3 + C3 \times 2 + C2 \times 1 + C1 \times 0$$

Where, C4 = frequency of respondent faces 'high' constraint in participating livelihood activity

C3 = frequency of respondent faces 'medium' constraint in participating livelihood activity

C2 = frequency of respondent faces 'low' constraint in participating livelihood activity

C1 = frequency of respondent faces 'not at all' constraint in participating livelihood activity

Level of constraint for each parameter was calculated and ranking among the parameters was done to identify the degree of difficulty faced by the returnees.

RESULT & DISCUSSION

Part I: Present Socio-economic condition

Table 1 : Economic Status of Respondents Family

Sl. No.	Category	No of respondents	Percentage
1	APL	145	38.1
2	BPL	153	40.3
3	Antodaya	17	4.5
4	AD-Hoc (Listed BPL)	46	12.1
5	None	19	5
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 1 shows that 40.3 percent respondents were from BPL families and 38.1 percent were from APL families. It indicates that respondents were not economically sound but surprisingly 5 percent respondents were found those had no ration card and could not receive any rationing facilities.




Figure 1

Table 2: Educational status of respondents

Sl. No.	Education Qualification	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Illiterate	20	5.3
2	Literate	16	4.2
3	Primary	54	14.2
4	Upper Primary	107	28.2
5	Secondary	155	40.7
6	Higher Secondary	24	6.4
7	Graduation	4	1.0
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Surrendered militants were classified according to their education in table-2. About 40 percent of them were passed secondary education and 28.2 percent had studied upto upper primary level. 4.2 percent of the militants were just literate and 6.4 percent were secondary passed.




Figure 2

Table 3: Occupation of the respondents

Sl. No	Occupation	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Small Business	48	12.5
2	Labor	130	34.3
3	Driver	16	4.2
4	Farmer	122	32.1
5	Govt. Job	19	5.0
6	Rubber cultivator	13	3.4
7	Pilgrim	29	7.6
8	House wife	3	0.9
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 3 discusses about the present occupationed status of the returnees among all respondents 34.3 percent were daily laborer, the percentage was higher compare to other occupation. Interestingly 5 percent respondents were also government service holders. Out of total respondents, 12.5 percent respondents were running their own business. Surprisingly, it was also found that after surrendered 7.6 percent respondents were performing the role of pilgrims in their residential villages.

Table 4: Average monthly income of respondents

Sl. No	Income (in month)	No of respondents	Percentage
1	1000-5000	281	73.9
2	6000-10000	89	23.5
3	11000-15000	10	2.6
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Monthly income of the respondents varied between the ranges of Rs.1000 to Rs. 15,000. About 73.9 percent were under the income group Rs. 1000 to Rs. 5000. There were only 2.6 per cent of them having an income of more than Rs. 10,000 rupees per month. While 23.5 percent were included in Rs. 6000 to Rs. 10,000 income group.

Table 5: Housing condition of respondents

Sl. No	House Type	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Kutchha	285	75.0
2	Semi Pukka	56	14.7
3	Pukka	39	10.3
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Housing condition of the respondent was revealed in table 5. Total 75 percent respondents were living in Kutchha houses and 10.3 percent had brick wall house.




Figure:3

Table 6: Type of Electricity in the house

Sl. No	Electricity Type	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Own	238	62.6
2	Shared	26	6.8
3	None	81	30.6
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 6 shows that 30.6 percent of the houses were not electrified and 6.8 percents were used shared connection and rest 62.6 percent respondents had their own electricity connection at their house.

Table 7: Type of water sources

Sl. No	Water Source	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Bore Well	169	44.5
2	River	6	1.5
3	Supply water	30	7.9
4	Tube Well	175	46.1
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

In table 7, it was found that approximately 44.5 percent of the houses depended on bore well for drinking water and 46.1 percent of the houses depended on tube well for drinking water. Surprisingly 1.5 percent respondents till used river water for drinking purpose.

Table 8: Type of sanitation

Sl. No	Sanitation type	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Kutchha	354	93.2
2	Pukka	26	6.8
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

After the review of table 8, it was observed that 93.2 percent respondents used kutchha toilets and the condition of their sanitary was so much unhygienic. Only 6.8 percent were using pukka toilets.

Table 9: Registered in MGNREGA

Sl. No	Registered	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Yes	281	73.9
2	No	99	26.1
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 9 shows that only 73.9 percent respondents informed that they were benefited by Government programme like MGNREGA. It was also showed that 26.1 percent respondents did not receive any work through MGNREGA because they were not registered and those who were having job card some of them did not get any facility.




Figure:4

Part II: Process of Rehabilitation

Table 10: Year of joining

Sl. No.	Year of joining	No of respondents	Percentage
1	1984-1988	8	3.0
2	1989-1993	19	7.2
3	1994-1998	94	35.5
4	1999-2003	122	46.0
5	2004-2008	22	8.3
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

After review of table 10, it may be observed that joining year of respondents as a extremists during 1999-2003 was high that was 46.4 percent. 35.5 percent respondents joined during 1994-1998. Surprisingly joining as an extremist decreased after 2003. Only 8.3 percent had joined

as extremist after 2003.




Figure:5

Table 11: Name of Associate group

Sl. No.	Associate group	No of respondents	Percentage
1	NLFT	276	70.3
2	ATTF	74	19.5
3	NLFT (BNCT)	35	9.2
4	TTFC	4	1.0
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 11 shows that the association of extremists. Maximum numbers (70.3%) of respondents were from NLFT group. Followed by 19.5 percent were from ATTF group, 9.2 percent were from BNCT group which was

the part of NLFT and rest were from TTFC group.




Figure:6

Table 12 : Year of surrender from various militant group

Sl. No.	Year of surrender	No of respondents	Percentage
1	1996-2001	76	20.0
2	2002-2007	206	54.3
3	2008-2013	98	25.7
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 12 shows that the range of surrender year of the respondents those were involved in extremism. Maximum (54.3%) number of respondents surrendered during 2002-2007 years. 20 percent surrendered during 1996-2001 and rest 25.7 percent respondents surrendered after 2007.

Table 13 : Reason for joining in the militant group

Sl. No.	Reason for joining	No of respondents	Percentage
1	For own land	204	53.6
2	Forcefully	73	19.3
3	Low income	66	17.4
	Misguided	37	9.7
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Reason for joining as militants is shown in the table 13. About 53.6 percent respondents had joined for free their land from Bengali people. They specially target the non-tribal population, whom they used to call as “**sheltered refugee**”. Economic backwardness was another reason of joining. As 17.4 percent respondents had joined for this cause. Rest 9.7 percent respondents were misguided and 19.3 percent had joined against their will.




Figure:7

Table 14 : Name of Surrender Camp

Sl. No.	Name	No of respondents	Percentage
1	TSR Camp	24	6.5
2	BSF Camp	42	11.0
3	Assam Rifles	64	16.8
4	Police Station	152	40.0
5	SDM Office	13	3.4
6	Governor House	42	11.0
7	CRPF Camp	43	11.3
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

The name of camp where the respondents had surrendered may be found from the above table. Maximum numbers of respondents had surrendered under the observation of Tripura police. Percentage of respondents those were surrendered in BSF camp and Governor House was same and it was 11 percent. 16.8 percent respondents surrendered in Assam Rifles camp. 6.5 percent were surrendered in TSR camp and rest 3.4 percent surrendered to SDM office.

Table 15 : Surrendered with weapon

Sl. No.	Weapon	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Yes	218	57.4
2	No	162	42.6
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 15 depicts that the percentage of respondents those had surrendered with weapons. About 57.4 percent respondents had surrendered with weapons.

Table 16: Duration of rehabilitation camp

Sl. No.	Duration (in month)	No of respondents	Percentage
1	6 -12	179	47.1
2	13 -24	201	52.9
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 16 shows that duration of rehabilitation camp after surrendered. 52.9 percent respondents stayed in rehabilitation camp for 13 months to 24 months and 47.1 percent respondents stayed for 6 months to 12 months.

Table 17 : Benefit of stipend getting during rehabilitation camp

Sl. No.	Stipend	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Yes	358	94.2
2	No	22	5.8
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 17 informs that only 59.7 percent respondents had received stipend during rehabilitation camp and rest of the respondents told that they had not received any kind of stipend during the time period of rehabilitation camp.




Figure:8

Part-III: Vocational Training Process

Table 18: Trade wise type of training

Sl. No.	Name of training	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Driving	196	51.7
2	Auto mobile engineering	13	3.4
3	Carpentry	13	3.4
4	Computer	16	4.2
5	Mechanic	30	7.9
6	Tailoring	83	21.8
7	Welding	6	1.6
8	Fishery	16	4.2
9	Grocery	7	1.8
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

From the Table 18, it may be observed that maximum respondents (51.7%) received training on Driving followed by 21.8 percent on Tailoring and 7.9 percent on Mechanical engineering respectively. Very few trainees also received training on Grocery (1.8%, fishery (4.2%), Computer (4.2%), Automobile engineering (3.4%) and Carpentry (3.4%) respectively.

Table 19: Name of training centre

Sl. No.	Name of training Centre	No of respondents	Percentage
1	NBIRT	46	12.1
2	Akash Vocational Training Society	126	33.2
3	VTC Shikaribari	27	7.1
4	VTC Ambassa	59	15.5
5	LACHHI Camp	83	21.8
6	Love story	33	8.7
7	VTC Karamcherra	612.1	1.6
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 19 shows the name of training centres where the respondents were trained. After review it was observed that maximum number of respondents (33.2%) trained by Akash Vocational Training Society. Lachhi camp trained 21.8 percent respondents while 15.5 and 12.1 percent respondents were trained by VTC Ambassa and NBIRT (NB Institute of Rural Technology) respectively. Only 8.7 and 7.1 percent respondents were trained by Love story training institute and VTC Sikaribari respectively and rest 1.6 percent respondents were trained by VTC Karamcherra.

Vocational Training for Tribal Returees




Figure :9

Table 20: Duration of training

Sl. No.	Duration of training (in month)	No of respondents	Percentage
1	1-12	166	43.7
2	13-24	214	56.3
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

From table 20 average duration of training programme may found. The duration of maximum number of training programme was 13-24 months (56.3%).

Table 21: Year wise training received

Sl. No.	Year	No of respondents	Percentage
1	1997-2002	73	19.2
2	2003-2008	202	53.2
3	2009-2014	105	27.6
	Total	380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Table 21 shows that majority of returnees had received training during 2003-2008. About 27.6 percent of trainees received training during 2009-2014 and only 19.2 percent received training during 1997-2002.

Table 22 : Usefulness of training

Sl. No.	Level of usefulness	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Most useful	83	21.9
2	Moderately useful	191	50.2
3	Less useful	69	18.2
4	Not useful	34	8.9
5	Wastage of time	3	0.8
	Total	380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

The percentage of usefulness of training was average. Only 50.2 percent respondents opined that a skill training was moderately useful.




Figure:10

Table 23 : Statement regarding training process

Sl. No.	Topic	SA	Agree	Disagree	SD	Total
1	Training was need based	86 (22.6)	260 (68.3)	17 (4.5)	17 (4.5)	380 (100)
2	Training was interesting	64 (16.9)	268 (70.6)	17 (4.5)	30 (7.9)	380 (100)
3	Trainers was very effective	57 (15.0)	215 (56.6)	69 (18.1)	39 (10.3)	380 (100)
4	Training methodology (lecture, case study, role play etc.) was effective	82 (21.5)	255 (67.2)	35 (9.1)	6 (1.5)	380 (100)
5	Training equipments were appropriate	78 (20.4)	211 (55.5)	75 (19.6)	17 (4.5)	380 (100)
6	Supplied Study materials were relevant	59 (15.5)	209 (55.1)	92 (24.2)	20 (5.3)	380 (100)
7	Language of training delivery (speech, training material) was understandable	117 (30.9)	237 (62.3)	23 (6.0)	3 (0.8)	380 (100)
8	Time provided for various practical exercise/activities was adequate	95 (24.9)	257 (67.5)	23 (6.0)	6 (1.5)	380 (100)
9	Duration of the training session was sufficient	62 (16.2)	241 (63.4)	72 (18.9)	6 (1.5)	380 (100)
10	Interaction with trainers were fruitful	7 (1.8)	265 (69.8)	36 (9.4)	3 (0.8)	380 (100)
11	Training environment was learner friendly (Technology and Equipment)	66 (17.4)	210 (55.3)	11 (2.9)	2 (0.4)	380 (100)
12	Relevant tool kit supplied	14 (3.8)	117 (30.9)	204 (53.6)	44 (11.7)	380 (100)
13	Trainer give idea in detail to apply skill after training program	39 (10.2)	138 (36.2)	15 (3.9)	56 (14.7)	380 (100)
14	Follow up support was provided after training	6 (1.5)	120 (31.7)	171 (44.9)	83 (21.9)	380 (100)

Source- Field Survey, 2016

From table 23, it was observed that almost in all the trainings met the stated objectives and training was need based according to the trainees. 71.6 percent trainees said that training was effective but 28.4 percent were said that training was not effective because they were not able to apply this skill in their practical life. 18.9 percent trainees were not happy with the duration of training. 19.1 percent trainees were not satisfied with training equipments. 78.9 percent trainees were agreed with the environment of training classes. 53.6 percent respondents were disagreed with the tool kit supplied during training session. 66.8 percent respondents were not satisfied about follow up support provided after training.

Part - IV : Impact of Vocational Training

Table 24 : Livelihood based on the Vocational Training received

Sl. No.	Livelihood based on the Vocational Training	No of respondents	Percentage
1	Yes	33	8.7
2	No	347	91.3
Total		380	100

Source- Field Survey, 2016

After review of above table it may be observed that only 8.7 percent returnees started/running their livelihood activities based on the vocational training they had received.

Vocational Training for Tribal Returees




Figure :11

Table 25 : Economic Impact of Vocational Training

Sl. No.	AREA	Impact		
		Unit	Before	After
			Average/ Percentage	Average/ Percentage
1	Average Monthly Income	Rs.	1869.6	5173.9
2	Average monthly Saving in banks	Rs.	350	659
4	Employment generation (Man days)	Days	24.4	32.1

Source- Field Survey, 2016

After training based livelihood activities it has been found that average monthly income had increased. After training average monthly income was increased from Rs.1869 to Rs. 5173 and average savings in bank was also increased from Rs 350 to Rs 659. Employment generation also increased due to the vocational training.




Figure:12

Table 26 : Social Inclusion of returnees

Sl.No.	Aspect	Unit	Before		After	
			Total	Percentage	Total	Percentage
1	Membership in SHG	Yes	14	43.4	24	73.9
2	G.P./VC	Yes	6	17.4	26	78.2
3	Club / Organization	Yes	17	52.2	29	86.9
4	Committee	Yes	9	26.1	11	34.8

Source- Field Survey, 2016

Before training respondents were not interested to involve any kind of organization but after training 86.9 percent of them were involved in various organizations. Membership in SHGs were also increased after training from 43.4 percent to 73.9 percent. The percentage of involvement in development work of Gram Panchayat or Village Committee had increased 78.2 percents from 17.4 percent after training.




Figure: 13

Table 27 : Social status & Self Development of returnees

Sl. No.	Social Status	Before Training				After Training			
		High x 3	Medium x 2	Low x 1	Total	High x 3	Medium x 2	Low x 1	Total
1	At home	32	18	8	58	56	6	2	64
2	Outside home	12	38	10	60	63	20	2	85
3	In peer group	27	22	13	62	33	36	3	75
Sl. No.	Self Development	Before Training				After Training			
		High x 3	Medium x 2	Low x 1	Total	High x 3	Medium x 2	Low x 1	Total
1	Confidence	15	34	18	67	60	22	2	84
2	Motivation	12	6	27	45	18	22	2	42
3	Knowledge	6	20	21	47	24	50	0	74
4	Information	12	8	25	45	39	40	0	79
5	Self esteemed	30	32	7	69	69	16	2	87

Source- Field Survey, 2016

In social status category it has been found that before training respondent's status at outside home and at home was low but after training it had increased as they were running various livelihood activities and also jointed various development activities. Status in peer group was also high after training. They were more confident and their knowledge information level had also increased after training. It indicates that after training, trainees were aware about social issues too.

Part V: Constrain of Livelihood through Vocational Training
Table 28 : Various Constraints

Sl no	Constraints	High x3	Medium x2	Low x1	Not at all x 0	Total	Rank
1	Inadequate finance	229	119	24	8	949	1
2	Lack of app livelihood activity	124	173	59	24	777	3
3	Less homestead land/ natural assets	99	159	65	57	680	5
4	Market accessibility	49	186	106	39	625	7
5	Technical knowledge	32	173	127	48	569	10
6	Required skill	34	195	102	49	594	8
7	Educational qualification	15	227	90	48	589	9
8	Raw materials	199	103	34	44	837	2
9	Poor infrastructure facilities	89	166	80	45	679	6
10	Less availability inputs/ equipments	105	165	47	63	692	4
11	Poor health status	26	122	130	102	452	13
12	Lack of marketing channels	28	212	86	54	594	8
13	Inadequate follow up	66	52	114	148	416	14
14	Less cooperation from family	19	54	71	236	236	19
15	Social insecurity	29	67	83	201	304	16
16	Inadequate training program	46	175	72	87	560	12
17	Natural calamities	20	37	110	213	244	18
18	Harassment during work outside	26	28	115	211	249	17
19	Lack of information on livelihoods activities	21	200	101	58	564	11
20	Lack of initiative mind/ confidence	54	40	114	172	356	15

Source- Field Survey, 2016

After completion of training all participants had gained knowledge and skill but due to some constraints they were not able to apply it into livelihood activities. Though this study it has been found that only 8.7 percent trainees were able to apply gained skill into income generation activities but remaining 91.3 percent trainees were not able to apply it after training due to various constraints.

Among all the respondents it had been found that due to financial constrains respondents were not able to start their livelihood activities. Above table shows that participants highly suffered from financial problem, lack of technical knowledge, proper required skill, lack of livelihood activity and raw material.

Less availability of land and other natural asset was another main constraint. Mostly this constraint was faced by the trainees trained in fishery. They gained proper knowledge and skill in fishery but they hardly had any pond to apply the skill received through vocational training.

It was also found that maximum numbers of respondents were not able to market their manufacturing products properly. After training they were able to manufacture product but due to improper marketing they were not facing problem.

PROBLEM, RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

4.1. Problem

- Maximum numbers of respondents mainly suffered from inadequate finance. After training they could not start their livelihood activities because of unavailable raw materials and finance.
- Respondents complained that crime cases against them were not withdrawn, though they were promised during surrender.
- Their children suffer from various social problems. Large number of respondents withdraws their children from schools because of financial problem and social inequality.
- As per the guideline, an immediate grant of Rs. 1.5 Lakh to be kept in a bank in the name of surrendered as fixed deposit for a period of 3 years as per scheme for surrender militants but some returnees could not get any compensation money.

4.2. Recommendation

Vocational training plays a vital role for employment generation and human capital formation. From the present study some major findings have taken out and on the basis of those few recommendations are given below for better and effective skill training program.

- Government should promote modern methods of cultivation to increase the potentialities in agriculture sector. Availability of new technology will attract greater numbers of youth and also help in the upliftment of their life.
- In order to encourage self employment, Government should tie up

Vocational Training for Tribal Returnees

with financial institutions to provide loans at subsidized interest rates for those who want to start a new venture on their own.

- Vocational training should be provided with long duration for their better upliftment and also to provide more training to the educated unemployed youth for their employment generation.

- The training courses were not successful due to improper marketing facilities. Authority of training institution should focus on the marketing aspects after training.

- Required raw materials should be provided after training to start their income generation activities.

- It was the need of the hour to arrange special training for the development of surrendered militants through Tripura Skill Development Mission.

- Every training program should have proper duration and sufficient practical time. The ratio of trainees and equipment should be sufficient enough to make trainings effective.

- After the training, the trainees need to be provided financial support or bank linkage which is most essential for every trainee to start or to run their livelihood activities.

4.3. Conclusion

This study gives the idea about the 'surrendered militants' life in Tripura. Various training institutes and NGOs play a vital role for rural development through providing various vocational training to them, which is very much essential for employment generation of surrendered militants. In the study area some trainees were successful by applying their gained skill into their livelihood activities but majorities of them were failure due to some constraints such as lack of finance, raw materials, land and also related equipments.

Therefore majority of trainees were unable to start/run their livelihood activity in spite of getting the training. Scheduled Tribes unemployed youth were more interested to take training for their employment generation. Government department plays a crucial role in the field of vocational training for returnee. It can be concluded that although the training programme can prove to be effective to the people to enhance their livelihood yet due to some loopholes the programme is unable to provide a positive impact on the livelihood of the surveyed people.

Case study - 1

Name - Raisurung Tripura

Fathers Name - Bistamani Tripura

Age - 30

Occupation - Social worker

Raisurung Tripura lives in Malirairoaja para village which is situated under Salema block, Dhalai District Tripura. After rehabilitation camp and received vocational training, he started to work as a social worker. Presently he earn Rs. 5000 p.m. Now he can afford education of his two sons and also social security of their life. Now he is happy because after surrendered he got facilities to live a peaceful life.

Case study - 2

Name - Suriyamani Debbarma
Fathers Name - Iresh Debbarma
Age - 48
Occupation - Small Business

Suriyamani Debbarma is a resident of Sikaribari village under Ambassa block, Dhalai district, Tripura. After training he had started tailoring business. From the business he earns Rs. 5000 p.m. Before surrendered his family members were suffering various problems like identity crisis, social status, economic problem etc. But now he and his family members had overcome from that and live happily and peacefully.

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
About the Tribal Research and Cultural Institute

Tribal Research and Cultural Institute was established under Tribal Welfare Department in the year 1970 as per decision of Government of Tripura for launching studies on the socio-economic aspect of the Different Tribes of Tripura besides evaluation of all development schemes taken up for the benefits of the tribes. This institute deals in fundamental and applied research works on the socio-economic field, evaluation, documentation of Tribal Art and Culture, preservation of tribal heritage, publication of research studies. Tribal Research and Cultural Institute collects manuscripts on tribal history and tradition, development of languages of different tribes etc. In addition, this Institute is also engaged for organizing seminar, workshop on different aspects of tribal development of issues along with training programme for the field level officers

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